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Post-Apartheid Kenya-South Africa Relations
Julius E. N yan g’oro, J.D.'
South Africa is making concerted ove lures to position itself well in the African continent 
in order to exploit available economic niches in the context o f  globalisation? To this 
end, its bilateral relations with countries like Kenya are not only significant, but are 
also o f paramount strategic importance. South Africa-Kenya relations will undoubtedly 
be marked by imbalances and inequalities which may generate mutual distrust i f  not 
conflicts. For instance while South Africa is more inclined towards SADC, Kenya is 
bound to throw its weight behind the EAC.
Introduction
South Africa has identified Kenya, Nigeria, Zimbabwe and Cote d'Ivoire as sub­
regional springboards for its economic thrust in Africa (SARDC, 1993: 21). The 
identification of these four countries as important players in the "new" economic 
policy o f South Africa is based on the perceived strength o f these economies 
relative to the rest of the continent. Significantly, these economies are the most 
diversified in sub-Sahara and do present "growth poles" i.i a region that has been 
ravaged by economic decline for almost two decades.1
It is particularly interesting that the identification of these four economies by 
South Africa as important players in the strategy for expansion into the rest of 
Africa came about fairly early in the newly "liberalised" era in South African 
politics. By 1992 only two years after the release of Nelson Mandela from almost 
three decades o f incarceration Pik Botha, South Africa's minister o f foreign 
affairs under the government of president F.W. dc Klerk, had visited all four 
countries to promote a "new understanding" and to prove that South Africa was
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no longer a threat to the security of other African countries and henceforth, 
economic linkages with the rest o f the continent would be emphasised. Trade 
figures were there to prove Pik Botha's point. Exports to African countries, 
excluding Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland which arc members o f the 
South Africa dominated South African Customs Union (SACU) rose to R 6 .1 
billion in 1992, as compared to, R5 billion in 1991 (SARDC, 1993: 21). A 
paradox, however, exists in the trade relationship between South Africa and the 
rest of the continent. In 1992, South Africa's arms industry supplied 16 African 
countries with arms which earned South Africa R 100 million. It may be recalled 
that during the heyday o f apartheid. South Africa's military dominance o f the 
Southern African region and the regime's campaign o f political, military and 
economic destabilisation had been one o f the most contentious issues in the 
relations between South Africa and the rest o f the continent.
This essay is an attempt to analyse South Africa's relationship with Kenya, one 
o f the presumed 'growth poles' on the continent. One o f the drawbacks o f this 
exercise is the paucity o f data on bilateral relations between the two countries, 
given the fact that it has only been a few years since there has been an overt 
acknowledgment on both sides o f an existing trade linkage. There are a few 
obvious activities, however, that can be noted as signifying a growing relationship 
between the two countries: daily airline service involving the national air carriers 
and other international carriers, trade missions and diplomatic exchange. The 
analysis in this essay, therefore, takes a broader outlook to the relationship 
between South Africa and Kenya and contextualises the relationship in terms o f 
both a dynamic and changing global economy, and South Africa's desire to 
become the regional (Sub-Saharan) economic powerhouse.
The Broader Context: South Africa in Sub-Sahara
South Africa has shown its great desire to become and maintain itself as sub- 
Saharan Africa's economic leader. The Johannesburg City Council for example 
has launched what it calls the "Africa Initiative Club" (AIC) whose main 
objective is to make Johannesburg the "gateway to Africa" by developing the 
concept of a sub-Saharan trading area with Johannesburg as the commercial 
capital o f the region (Into Africa, January 1994: 6). Part o f the AIC's activities
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would be to participate in, or create new joint ventures which will seek to finance 
South African exports to other African countries.
The drive by the Johannesburg City Council to engage in these commercial 
activities comes on the heels o f tremendous economic problems faced by South 
Africa in spite o f the fact that South Africa's economy remains the most 
diversified and dynamic on the continent. Economic sanctions o f the 1980s 
certainly took their toll on South Africa's economy. The General Agreement on 
Trade and Tariffs (GATT), for example, estimates that international trade and 
financial sanctions imposed on South Africa between 1985 and 1991 cost the 
country almost R40 billion-US$12.6 billion at the 1993 rate o f exchange 
(SARDC, 1993: 18). Unemployment which runs at about 50 percent-mainly 
affecting the black population-continues to be a drag on the economy. Even after 
the tremendous events leading to the April 1994 elections, little foreign 
investment has come in. At the tune of writing this paper, South Africa is coming 
out o f  the longest recession in its history-four long painful year and the worst 
since the world depression o f the 1930s. The non-farm economy has continued 
to struggle with total production essentially stagnant. Mining is slightly up and 
for the first time in many years, manufacturing output is climbing.
This is the context which informs South Africa's desire and strategy in dealing 
with the rest o f the continent. But as South Africa maps out its Africa strategy, 
several key issues need to be identified as playing an important role in the 
equation-issues that must be resolved if the new expansionism is to succeed: the 
state's role as a long time and central player in economic organisation as part o f 
the grand apartheid strategy for white welfarism; the inefficiencies created by 
state intervention at various levels; a black labour market that seeks to liberate 
itself from bureaucratic controls but with no guarantee that the "market" will 
deliver where the apartheid state failed due to its inherent inequalities based on 
race; the need to address serious inequities and maldistribution o f  resources 
within the South African political economy; and the structural constraints 
created by the historical development of South Africa's capital and its relationship 
and response to globalization. Thus, South Africa-Kenya relations cannot be 
understood unless the other dynamics are brought into the picture.
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The other context of course is Kenya's political economy. Even though Kenya is 
still the most diversified of the East African economics, there has been a steady 
decline in performance in the last few years. According to Svvamy (1994), Kenya 
started the 1980s with many more favorable economic features than other sub- 
Saharan countries. He attributes the structure and dynamism of the economy in 
the late 1970s to "the favorable policy environment' (1994: 193). But economic 
management deteriorated in the late 1970s resulting in the intensification or the 
emergence of a number of major distortions. Thus during the 1980s progress was 
measurable and significant in only a few areas. By the late 1980s and early 
1990s, most o f the gains of the mid 1970s had been lost.
Swamy (1994: 193-194) argues that the deterioration o f the Kenyan economy can 
be traced to three basic factors. First, the stated policies o f efficiency and budget 
balancing were undermined by implementation that was often lethargic and 
sometimes contrary to the stated policies. Second, the lack o f transparency in the 
implementation of reforms often dampened or nullified the structural reforms that 
were undertaken. Here the problems associated with corruption and rent-seeking 
are o f significance. Third, a lack o f commitment to full "liberalisation" o f the 
economy by the continuation of state controls of pricing structure especially in the 
agricultural sector, and the state's inability to escape political pressure. Michael 
Chege (1994) argues that the poor implementation o f economic reforms under the 
regime o f President Moi has largely been due to the perceived need to redress 
some of the ethnic inequities benefiting the Kikuyu under the Kenyatta regime. 
Moi's government has systematically favored the so-called Kalenjin ethnic group 
in its quest to counterbalance early Kikuyu domination.
To achieve Kalenjin dominance while maintaining the hegemony o f the Kenya 
Africa National Union (KANU) has proven difficult for President Moi. Since 
December 1991 Kenya has regained the status of a multi-party polity but only 
after foreign donors threatened to or did terminate their economic assistance. 
Significantly, in November 1991, Kenya's leading donors (the Paris Club) froze 
US$100 million in program aid, pending improvements in its human rights record 
and economic management. The repeal o f the single-party provision in the 
constitution in December 1991 was partly a result o f this external pressure. The 
other side of the equation was the pressure mounted by domestic proponents o f
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multi-partyism, many of whom form the opposition in parliament today. In any 
case by 1990, Kenya's economy was on a downward path, with a constant per 
capita GDP growth rate officially estimated at -0.9 percent between 1980 and 
1987. As Chcgc has concluded, Kenya's
p o litic a l clim ate w as unlikely to a llow  external grants and loans to take  
agriculture's place. Despite heroic attem pts to liberalize international trade 
and establish duty-free "export-processing zones" , British, A m erican and 
other Western capital w as divesting from Kenya. And although the country  
had a high (2 0  percent) dom estic  investm ent rate, new  capital w as  
channeled increasingly into construction and non-tradables rather than 
manufacturing or agriculture. Tourism , the leading foreign ex ch an ge  
so u r ce , w as extrem ely  vulnerable to political unrest and adverse  
international publicity (1994: 2 65 ).
Both Swamy and Chege ignore the structural inequalities embedded in Kenya's 
political economy since the time of independence and the contribution o f resource 
maidistribution to the current crisis (Kitching, 1980). The two authors instead 
put emphasis on the failure o f the current regime to undertake political and 
economic reforms which would put Kenya in the good stead o f International 
Financial Institutions (IFIs) with the assumption that once reforms are 
successfully implemented, Kenya's economy will dramatically improve. O f 
course tins is a highly debatable assumption given the experience o f other African 
countries (Callaghy and Ravenhill, 1993) and given trends in the global political 
economy away from primary to manufacturing exports (Brown and Tiffen, 1994). 
What may be important in the final analysis is not how well an African country 
reforms or adjusts under the tutelage of lFis. but rather how a country can 
position itself to participate more vigorously in the new international division o f 
labor (NIDL) under a restructured global economy (Mittelman, 1994).
Indeed, this may be the ultimate question facing both Kenya and South Africa as 
the two countries position themselves in terms of (a) developing bilateral 
relations, (b) improving their relative positions in the global economy, and (c) 
deepening their respective domestic economies. 1 would argue that (b) and (c) 
may be more important considerations in the short term (5-10 years) than (a), in 
spite of the seeming importance o f an available market for each others products. 
South Africa, for example, long isolated in international trade, has begun an
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aggressive program to increase trade with the Gulf States, China, South Korea 
and South America all areas of rapid economic growth and important players in 
the New International Division of Labour (N1DL). South Africa has joined China 
in a licensing agreement to produce the Volkswagen Jetta and has also entered 
into a similar agreement with the Korea Motor Company (SARDC, 1993: 21). 
If South Africa is able to create a niche for itself in global manufacturing, then 
there exists a possibility of rapid economic growth similar to that experienced by 
the newly industrialised countries (NICS) of South East Asia and Latin America 
(Gereffi and Wyman, 1990). On the other hand, Kenya, along with other sub- 
Saharan countries, stands little chance of achieving NIC or near-NIC status given 
both the predominance o f neo-liberalism in the current global restructuring 
process, and the relative weakness of the state in these countries.
Economic trends in Africa may thus suggest that South Africa is poised to 
overwhelm the rest of the continent in terms o f economic prowess. Yet there are 
signs that after all, South Africa faces challenges that may not be easy to 
overcome, given the structural rigidity of its economy and other regional 
dynamics. These challenges include the relative high cost o f labour within South 
Africa compared to neighboring countries such as Zimbabwe. Lower labour costs 
could make other countries more attractive to Transnational Corporations 
(TNCS) as indeed has already happened in the case o f Mauritius. Furthermore, 
South Africa has to balance its economic consolidation strategy in Southern 
Africa, where it is the predominant partner in SADC, and its economic expansion 
strategy in the rest o f the continent, including Kenya. This latter point needs 
elaboration in light o f Kenya's historical role in the East African region.
Kenya in East Africa: Community Revival or Further Disintegration?
Up to 1977, the East African Community (EAC) comprising Kenya, Uganda and 
Tanzania, served as a model for regional integration in Africa. Studies have 
shown that, on balance, the EAC produced positive results in terms o f economic 
growth and the synchronisation, rationalisation and promotion o f a regional 
market (Haziewood, 1975). The EAC had its origins in the colonial period when 
the British colonial authorities in East Africa established the East African High 
Commission (EAHC) to oversee the transport and communication network in the
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three countries. Upon the attainment o f independence by Tanzania Mainland in 
1961, the EAHC was renamed the East African Common Services Organization 
(EACSO) but proceeded to perform the same functions as its predecessor (Nye, 
1965).
Between 1962 and 1966, Uganda and Tanzania increasingly became unhappy 
with the way EACSO operated, especially in the location o f the headquarters of 
the key sectors: railways, harbors, post and telecommunications, airline and 
EACSO headquarters itself were all located in Kenya. Both Uganda and 
Tanzania argued that there was a need to redistribute and relocate the 
headquarters of the various activities of EACSO. Thus in 1966, the East African 
Community was established- as a successor to EACSO. Tanzania became the 
headquarters for the Community itself in Arusha and the harbors corporation 
went to Dar es Salaam instead of Mombasa. Uganda became the headquarters 
o f post and telecommunications, and o f the East African Development Bank. 
Kenya retained headquarters for East African Airways and the railway 
corporation. The original maldistribution o f the community's resources and the 
political differences between Kenya on the one hand and Uganda and Tanzania 
on the other, especially after the overthrow of President Obote in Uganda in 
1971, created tensions that led to the breakdown of the community in 1977.
Nabudere (1981) has argued that the breakdown of the community was inevitable 
given its neo-colonial nature, and its original objective in 1948: to serve the 
economic interests o f Britain, the colonial power had to ensure the expansion o f 
British capital in East Africa. Thus from the perspective o f British capital, 
economic integration in East Africa provided a much desired framework for 
stability and expansion o f the market with Kenya as the peripheral headquarters 
of such an expansion. With the independence o f Tanzania and Uganda, and the 
need to create autonomous and internally generated development, EASCO was 
absolutely the wrong institution for that purpose. The fine tuning o f EASCO by 
East African governments amid the creation o f a revamped EAC could not 
overcome its legacy as a colonial institution.
What is o f interest now is the move to revive the community by the current 
governments o f Presidents Daniel arap Moi in Kenya, Ali Hassan Mwinyi in
56 Kenya-South Africa Relations
Tanzania, and Yoweri Museveni in Uganda. All three presidents were not on the 
scene when the Community broke up in 1977, yet the legacy and the bitterness 
that resulted from the break up has continued to haunt regional relationships both 
at the political and economic levels. It is only since December 1993, for example, 
that passenger railway serv ice has been restored between Nairobi and Kampala 
(W eekly Review, August and December 1993). In thinking about reviving the 
community, several issues must be addressed.
In 1980 Tanzania became a member of the Southern African Development 
Coordination Conference (SADCC). SADCC was established as part o f a larger 
strategy to fight against apartheid in South Africa. SADCC's membership was 
all countries south o f Tanzania, except South Africa itself (Lee, 1989). In August 
1994, South Africa joined the former SADCC members in the newly-constituted 
Southern African Development Community (SADC). The question for Tanzania 
now is whether it is willing to cast its lot with its former partners in EAC or 
continue to be part of a larger, and probably more dynamic regional organization, 
i.e. SADC. To be sure, Tanzania's position in SADC is very tenuous given the 
fact that geographically it is in the periphery o f SADC and economically it is one 
o f the least developed states in the region. Its influence in SADC is thus bound 
to be limited. But rejoining a revamped EAC may not necessarily provide a 
solution to Tanzania's troubled economy. It will be going back to the old 
structures that led to the breakdown of the community in the first place.
Kenya, on the other hand, may see its fortunes at least in the near term tied to a 
revamped EAC. Tanzania both as a member of EAC and SADC may provide an 
avenue for Kenya to be an active economic partner of SADC. This o f course 
would produce mutual benefits for Kenya and South Africa with the latter being 
the predominant economic power in the region. As it stands now, however, the 
situation is too flux to allow for a clear determination o f the nature o f the 
relationship that is likely to develop between EAC and SADC.
Kenya, South Africa and Beyond
Bilateral relations between Kenya and South Africa demand an analysis which 
takes into account the relative, and relatively marginal, position o f both countries
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in the NIDL. Yet South Africa is now poised to enter a new era. In spite o f deep 
structural impediments, the South African economy provides an opportunity for 
transnational capital to penetrate the rest o f the continent. South Africa has a 
comparative advantage over South East Asia or Latin America in this regard 
because o f its geographical location, and in terms of existing capital networks 
between South African capital and Kenya, and between South Africa and EAC. 
An example o f this is the tourist industry networks in the chain o f hotels (e.g. 
Protea and Sun) in East Africa which have their base in South Africa.
Yet the ultimate question in assessing the relationship between Kenya and South 
Africa is how effective will South African capital be in playing an intermediary 
role between global capital and production activities in Kenya and the rest o f the 
region? Two seemingly contradictory trends cum scenarios emerge as one 
ponders this question. The first scenario is that o f South African domestic capital 
seeking outlets and new opportunities for capital investment beyond SADC 
territory. In this regard, banking capital (e.g. Standard Chartered) is making its 
presence felt, not only in Kenya, but also in Tanzania. The latter o f course had 
nationalised all foreign banking institutions in the wake of the Arusha Declaration 
and has only recently opened its capital markets for foreign banks. Thus, in 
purely regional calculations, South Africa's domestic capital is poised to move 
into relatively closed markets north of the Limpopo.
The second scenario which emerges is that of South Africa being the facilitator, 
the entry point for global capital into the Southern African region including 
Kenya. This scenario complicates matters quite a bit if we are to consider that 
South Africa's domestic capital would prefer to have the region exclusively to 
itself in order to face less competition and have breathing space to allow for more 
efficiency in its operations. The latter point is especially important because one 
of the issues coming to the fore now is that sanctions against South Africa during 
the apartheid era created tremendous hardships in the operation o f South African 
industry. Even though South African capital is the most dynamic on the 
continent, it is still backward by global standards (Obeng in Adedeji, ed., 1996).
As the two seemingly contradictory scenarios play themselves out, we have to be 
mindful o f other processes at.work which inevitably will influence the outcome
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of future relations between Kenya and South Africa. 1 have in mind the demands 
that civil society in both countries is placing on the state. Since the recent multi­
party elections in Kenya in 1992, various factions in civil society -  labour, 
students, NGOs -- have continued their militancy and have demanded more 
accountability on the part o f the state. Furthermore, there is a growing demand 
for redistribution of resources in society which the Kenyan regime may not be in 
a position to effect due to the consolidation o f inequitable policies in economic 
development (Ajulu, 1995: Barkan, 1994). The pressure on the regime suggests 
that even though Kenya was an attractive destination for foreign capital in the 
1970s and 1980s, it may be less so in the 1990s. Foreign capital has always been 
wary of political instability and would prefer to operate in an environment which 
allows for maximisation o f profit. As it stands now, Kenya is one o f the most 
unstable political economies in the region (Barkan, 1994). As the Moi regime 
continues to resist pressure from civil society and is less responsive to demands 
for more accountability, foreign capital has shown its impatience by, among other 
things, balking at large capital projects cherished by the regime. One such project 
is the Eldoret International Airport (Herald, March 15, 1995; New African, 
July/August 1995: 24-26). While the Moi regime has insisted that the building 
o f the airport will open up the Rift Valley Province to economic development, 
critics argue that another airport is not a priority and that, in any case, it is wrong. 
They point to the fact that Nairobi and Mombasa international airports need 
considerable modernisation and that they will remain the most important centres 
for air traffic. When big projects such as the Eldoret airport continue to be in 
limbo, the attractiveness o f Kenya for foreign capital diminishes.
While the Kenyan regime seems confused on how to handle civil society, the 
Mandela regime in South Africa, given its origins in the protest movement, fully 
acknowledges the importance o f civil society. Thus, instead o f alienating 
im portant segments such as labour, the Mandela regime has sought a 
"corporatist" solution much to the criticism o f radical elements in the labor 
movement who see "corporatism" as a surrender to big capital (Nzimande and 
Sikhosana, 1995: 47-65). But as Jeremy Baskin (1993) has argued, even though 
there is a trend towards bargained corporatism in South Africa, this strategy7 is 
less likely to succeed in the long run because o f the relative weakness o f labour, 
thus making industry the prime mover as opposed to a genuinely bargained
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compromise which would give labour a say in policymaking. Thus what seems 
to emerge even in South Africa is the diminished significance o f civil society -- 
at least the segment that does not own capital — in shaping industrial and 
economic policy. One can only surmise that the Mandela regime will continue to 
be squeezed between the desire to deliver on the revolutionary promise o f 
economic redistribution and the "hard" realities of ownership o f the means o f 
production by relatively few members o f society (Saul, 1992).
In essence then, the political economies o f both Kenya and South Africa exhibit 
uncertainties and deep structural problems which are bound to create obstacles 
in economic bilateral relations. Furthermore, recent data on trade show that 
South Africa's exports to Kenya are fairly minimal. In 1992, South Africa 
exported goods worth R23.8 million (approximately US$7 million). This is a 
minuscule amount compared, for example, with exports to the UK 
(R380,000,000) or Ireland (R204,000,000) during the same period (SA Ministry 
o f Finance, 1993). Kenya's exports to South Africa on the other hand are 
negligible.
Conclusion
The picture o f economic bilateral relations between Kenya and South Africa 
presented in this essay seems to be a pessimistic one. In several ways that is true, 
but 1 must hasten to add that the picture is a realistic one. As the euphoria o f a 
newly democratically-elected government in South Africa fades into the 
background, the realities o f the structural problems are emerging with a 
vengeance. South Africa, first and foremost, quickly has become a leading player 
in Southern Africa in the context o f an enlarged SADC. SADC has placed 
binding obligations on member countries, with the aim of promoting economic 
integration towards a fully developed common market. This reality o f course 
creates immediate problems for Kenya which is not tied formally into the SADC 
network. Thus, looking further down the road, the identification o f Kenya as part 
of ever-expanding South African economic interests may only be useful as a long­
term strategy as opposed to an immediate or even medium term proposition.
Kenya, on the other hand, may see its immediate economic fortunes with a
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renewed and invigorated East African Community, although this is proving to be 
a much slower development than previously anticipated (East African Standard, 
21 April 1995). Even though more trade with South Africa is an officially stated 
goal, what Kenya seems to be exporting more to South Africa is its skilled human 
resources — doctors, lawyers, engineers, teachers, etc. This in turn creates a crisis 
o f development within Kenya itself. But in the final analysis Kenya actually still 
suffers from the classic symptoms o f underdevelopment and dependency on 
countries of the North. Although the vocabulary of a New International Division 
o f Labour may be fashionable to describe trends in many parts o f the world, it is 
still a far cry from being a reality in Africa, let alone in South Africa-Kenya 
bilateral relations.
Notes
1 T he conventional m easure o f  econ om ic trouble on the A frican continent has been the ubiquity o f  
Structural A djustm ent Program s (S A P S ) across sub-Sahara and the continued/increased  
m arginalisation o f  the continent in the global political econ om y (S w atuk  and Sh aw , 1994).
“ This b eco m es very apparent w hen one com pares Africa's dism al position  in the late-20th  Century  
glob a l political econ om y with the relatively favorable political and eco n o m ic  conditions w hich  
obtained for many Asian states in the 1960s and 1970s and ultim ately led to the phenom enon o f  the 
N IC s (Cheru in A dedeji, ed , 1996; Stein, 1994; Sw atuk &  Sh aw , 1994).
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